


Secure Face Matching Using Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Vishnu Boddeti
Michigan State University

October 23rd, 2018


>>> Face Representation and Matching

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


* Face Matching:



>>> Security Vulnerabilities


* Attacks on Biometric Systems:



¹ Mai, Guangcan, Kai Cao, C. YUEN Pong, and Anil K. Jain. "On the Reconstruction of Face Images from Deep Face Templates." PAMI 2018


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* Attacks on Templates:


* Face reconstruction from template¹



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
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
* Attacks on Templates:

- * Face reconstruction from template¹
- * Privacy leakage through attribute prediction from template




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


(a) Fuzzy Vault

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


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


(b) Geometrical Transformations


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


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


(c) Correlation with Random Masks



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
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


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


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

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
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* Drawback: Trade-Off matching performance for template security.

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- * Encryption scheme needs to allow computations directly on the encrypted data.

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This Paper Explores:

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
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This Paper Explores:

- * **feasibility** of fully homomorphic encryption for secure face matching.
- * **efficiency** of fully homomorphic encryption for secure face matching.


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- * Client device:
 - * generates cryptographic keys




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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 - * transmits encrypted scores to client
- * Client device:
 - * decrypts received scores and makes decision



>>> Homomorphic Inner Products

* Feature Matching:

$$\text{Euclidean Distance: } d(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}\|_2^2 = \mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{y}^T \mathbf{y} - 2\mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{y}$$

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$$s(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \mathcal{D} \left(\sum_{i=1}^d \mathcal{E}(x_i, \boldsymbol{\theta}_e) \mathcal{E}(y_i, \boldsymbol{\theta}_e), \boldsymbol{\theta}_d \right)$$

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
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 - * Encode entire vector at once + repetitive circular shift and addition



>>> Experimental Setup

- * **Datasets:** LFW, IJB-A, IJB-B and CASIA
- * **Models:** FaceNet (128-D) and SphereFace (512-D)
- * **Evaluation:** True Accept Rate 0.01%, 0.1% and 1% FAR
- * **Options:** different quantization, security levels, dimensionality of features

>>> Computational Complexity

- * Pairwise Matching Time
 - * Homomorphic Encryption
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- * Template Size
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Security in bits (λ)	Dim (d)	No FHE		No Batching				Batching					
		Time	Mem	Time (ms)			Mem	Time (ms)			Mem		
		(μ s)	(KB)	Enc	Score	Dec	Total	(MB)	Enc	Score	Dec	Total	(KB)
	64	0.44	2.0										
	128	0.89	4.0										
	512	3.48	16.0										
	1024	7.49	32.0										

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128	64	0.44	2.0	4.40	5.25	0.01	9.66	0.25					
	128	0.89	4.0	17.57	21.05	0.02	38.64	1.0					
	512	3.48	16.0	280.19	343.81	0.08	624.07	16.5					
	1024	7.49	32.0	2214.88	2924.75	0.33	5139.97	131.0					

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	512	3.48	16.0	280.19	343.81	0.08	624.07	16.5	0.58	1.80	0.07	2.45	16.0
	1024	7.49	32.0	2214.88	2924.75	0.33	5139.97	131.0	2.27	8.36	0.30	11.42	32.0

>>> Homomorphic Matching Performance

- * Face verification: different quantization levels

Table: Face Recognition Accuracy (TAR @ FAR in %)

Dataset	Method	128-D FaceNet			512-D SphereFace		
		0.01%	0.1%	1%	0.01%	0.1%	1%
IJB-B	No FHE	25.77	48.31	74.47	7.86	31.27	69.83
	FHE (2.5×10^{-3})	25.78	48.28	74.46	7.86	31.27	69.82
	FHE (1.0×10^{-2})	25.71	48.31	74.44	7.80	31.29	69.75
	FHE (1.0×10^{-1})	23.75	46.08	72.87	7.49	30.92	67.45

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- * Facial template security is of growing importance.
- * Fully homomorphic face matching in encrypted domain is feasible and practical.
- * What next?
 - * Limitation: score thresholding is performed after decryption
 - * Consequence: hill climbing attack is still possible from decrypted score
 - * Limitation: encryption and decryption key are on client device
 - * Consequence: key management on client device is the weakest link