Towards Learning Semantically Controllable Representations
Vishnu Naresh Boddeti
Michigan State University
DLAI5
Slides: hal.cse.msu.edu/talks
VishnuBoddeti
Data, data everywhere $\dots$
Marie-Antoinette by Élisabeth Vigée Le Brun, 1778
Representations of Data
Marie-Antoinette sketch by Hippolyte Louis ´Emile Pauquet
Representations of Data
Marie-Antoinette by Jacques-Louis David, 1793
Representations of Data
"Let them eat cake"
Goal: build representation learning systems
Progress In Machine Learning
Speech Processing
Image Analysis
Natural Language Processing
Physical Sciences
Key Driver
Data, Compute, Algorithms
State-of-Affairs
(report from the real-world)
"Tay, Microsoft's AI chatbot, gets a crash course in racism from Twitter"
March 24, 2016
"FaceApp's creator apologizes for the app's skin-lightening 'hot' filter"
April 25, 2017
"Facial recognition is accurate, if you're a white guy"
Feb. 09, 2018
lighter faces: 0.7% error
darker faces: 12.9% error
- Boulamwini and Gebru, "Gender Shades:Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification," FAT 2018
"The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It"
Jan. 18, 2020
Real world machine learning systems are effective but,
are biased,
violate user’s privacy and
not trustworthy.
Today's Agenda
Build ML systems that are fair and trustworthy.
Fair and Trustworthy ML
Mechanism: control semantic information in data representations
100 Years of Data Representations
Control Mathematical Concepts
variance, sparsity, translation, rotation, scale, etc.
Bias in Learning
- Boulamwini and Gebru, "Gender Shades:Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification," FAT 2018
Privacy Leakage
- Training:
- Inference: Microsoft Smile classification
- Target Task
- Privacy Leakage
- B. Sadeghi, L. Wang, V.N. Boddeti, "Adversarial Representation Learning With Closed-Form Solvers," CVPRW 2020
Information Leakage from Representations
- Learned Embeddings:
- Attacks on Embeddings:
Face reconstruction from template
Privacy leakage through attribute prediction from template
- Mai et. al., ‘‘On the reconstruction of face images from deep face templates," IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 2018
Dark Secret of Deep Learning
Recklessly absorb all statistical correlations in data
Next Era of Data Representations
Control Semantic Concepts
age, gender, domain, etc.
Controlling Semantic Information
- Target Concept: Smile & Private Concept: Gender
- Problem Definition:
- Learn a representation $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ from data $\mathbf{x}$
- Retain information necessary to predict target attribute $\mathbf{t}\in\mathcal{T}$
- Remove information related to a desired sensitive attribute $\mathbf{s}\in\mathcal{S}$
Technical Challenge
- How to explicitly control semantic information in learned representations?
- Can we explicitly control semantic information in learned representations?
The Can
Short Answer: Yes, we can, sometimes.
A Subspace Geometry Perspective
- Case 1: when $\mathcal{S} \perp \!\!\! \perp \mathcal{T}$ (Gender, Age)
- Case 3: when $\mathcal{S} \sim \mathcal{T}$ ($\mathcal{T}\subseteq\mathcal{S}$)
- Case 2: when $\mathcal{S} \not\perp \!\!\! \perp \mathcal{T}$ (Car, Wheels)
- B. Sadeghi, L. Wang, V.N. Boddeti, ‘‘Adversarial Representation Learning with Closed-Form Solutions," CVPRW 2020
The How
Short Answer: It depends.
A Fork in the Road
- Design metric to measure semantic attribute information
- Learn metric to measure semantic attribute information
Adversarial Representation Learning
Game Theoretic Formulation
- Three player game between:
- Encoder extracts features $\mathbf{z}$
- Target Predictor for desired task from features $\mathbf{z}$
- Adversary extracts sensitive information from features $\mathbf{z}$
\begin{equation}
\begin{aligned}
\min_{\mathbf{\Theta}_E,\mathbf{\Theta}_T} & \underbrace{\color{cyan}{J_t(\mathbf{\Theta}_E,\mathbf{\Theta}_T)}}_{\color{cyan}{\mbox{error of target}}} \quad s.t. \mbox{ } \min_{\mathbf{\Theta}_A} \underbrace{\color{orange}{J_s(\mathbf{\Theta}_E,\mathbf{\Theta}_A)}}_{\color{orange}{\mbox{error of adversary}}} \geq \alpha \nonumber
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
- Adversary: learned measure of semantic attribute information
How do we learn model parameters?
- Simultaneous/Alternating Stochastic Gradient Descent
- Update target while keeping encoder and adversary frozen.
- Update adversary while keeping encoder and target frozen.
- Update encoder while keeping target and adversary frozen.
Three Player Game: Linear Case
- Global solution is $(w_1, w_2, w_3)=(0, 0, 0)$
What we get
What we want
- P. Roy and V.N. Boddeti, "Mitigating Information Leakage in Image Representations: A Maximum Entropy Approach", CVPR 2019
Optimizing Likelihood Can be Sub-Optimal
Adversary
Encoder
Equilibrium
- Limitations:
- Encoder target distribution leaks information !!
- Practice: simultaneous SGD does not reach equilibrium
- Class Imbalance: likelihood biases solution to majority class
Maximum Entropy ARL Continued...
- Three player game between:
- Encoder extracts features $\mathbf{z}$
- Target Predictor for desired task from features $\mathbf{z}$
- Adversary extracts sensitive information from features $\mathbf{z}$
- Three Player Non-Zero Sum Game:
\begin{equation}
\begin{aligned}
\min_{\mathbf{\theta}_A} & \mbox{ } \underbrace{\color{orange}{J_1(\mathbf{\theta}_E,\mathbf{\theta}_A)}}_{\color{orange}{\mbox{error of adversary}}} \\
\min_{\mathbf{\theta}_E,\mathbf{\theta}_T} & \mbox{ } \underbrace{\color{cyan}{J_2(\mathbf{\theta}_E,\mathbf{\theta}_T)}}_{\color{cyan}{\mbox{error of target}}} - \alpha \underbrace{\color{orange}{J_3(\mathbf{\theta}_E,\mathbf{\theta}_A)}}_{\color{orange}{\mbox{entropy of adversary}}} \nonumber
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
Geometry of Optimization
\begin{equation}
\begin{aligned}
\min_{\mathbf{\Theta}_E} & \ \ {\color{cyan}{J_t(\mathbf{\Theta}_E)}} \\
\mathrm {s.t. \ \ } & {\color{orange}{J_s (\mathbf{\Theta}_E) \ge \alpha}} \nonumber
\end{aligned}
\end{equation}
- Non-convexity: feasible set is non-convex
- Non-differentiability: solution is either a plane or a line
B. Sadeghi, R. Yu, V.N. Boddeti, ‘‘On the Global Optima of Kernelized Adversarial Representation Learning," ICCV 2019
Solution: Spectral Adversarial Representation Learning
- Lagrangian formulation:
\begin{equation}
\min_{\mathbf{\Theta}_E} \Big\{(1-\lambda){\color{cyan}{J_t(\mathbf{\Theta}_E)}}- (\lambda) {\color{orange}{J_s (\mathbf{\Theta}_E)} }\Big\} \nonumber
\end{equation}
Non-Convex + Non-Differentiable
- Solution:
\begin{equation}
\mathbf{\Theta}_E, r^*=\mbox{Negative Eig} \Big\{\mathbf{X}\left(\lambda \color{orange}{\mathbf{S}^T \mathbf{S}} - (1-\lambda)\color{cyan}{\mathbf{Y}^T \mathbf{Y}} \right)\mathbf{X}^T \Big\}\nonumber
\end{equation}
Global Optima + Optimal Dimensionality + Performance Bounds
B. Sadeghi, R. Yu, V.N. Boddeti, "On the Global Optima of Kernelized Adversarial Representation Learning," ICCV 2019
Closed-Form Solvers
- Encoder extracts features $\mathbf{z}$
- Target Predictor: kernel ridge regressor to predict target from $\mathbf{z}$
- Adversary: kernel ridge regressor to extract sensitive information from $\mathbf{z}$
B. Sadeghi, L. Wang, V.N. Boddeti, "Adversarial Representation Learning with Closed-Form Solutions," CVPRW 2020
Properties of Ideal Embedding
- Embedding Dimensionality
- # of negative eigenvalues of
\begin{equation}
\mathbf{B} = \lambda \tilde{\mathbf{S}}^T \tilde{\mathbf{S}} -(1-\lambda)\tilde{\mathbf{Y}}^T \tilde{\mathbf{Y}}
\end{equation}
Bounds on Trade-Off
Application-1: Fair Classification
- UCI Adult Dataset (creditworthiness, gender)
Method |
Income |
Gender |
$\Delta^*$ |
Raw Data |
84.3 |
98.2 |
22.8 |
Remove Gender |
84.2 |
83.6 |
16.1 |
Zero-Sum game |
84.4 |
67.7 |
0.3 |
Non-Zero-Sum Game |
84.6 |
67.3 |
0.1 |
Global-Optima |
84.1 |
67.4 |
0.0 |
Hybrid |
83.8 |
67.4 |
0.0 |
$^*$ Absolute difference between adversary accuracy and random chance
Fair Classification: Interpreting Encoder Weights
Embedding Weights (Adult Dataset)
Application-2: Mitigating Privacy Leakage
- CelebA Dataset (smile, gender)
Method |
Smile |
Gender |
$\Delta^*$ |
Raw Data |
93.1 |
82.9 |
21.5 |
Zero-Sum game |
91.8 |
72.5 |
11.1 |
Non-Zero-Sum Game |
91.6 |
62.1 |
0.7 |
Global-Optima |
92.0 |
61.4 |
0.0 |
Hybrid |
92.5 |
61.4 |
0.0 |
$^*$ Absolute difference between adversary accuracy and random chance
Application-3: Mitigating Privacy Leakage
Application-4: Illumination Invariance
- 38 identities and 5 illumination directions
- Target:Identity Label
- Sensitive:Illumination Label
Method |
$s$ (lighting) |
$t$ (identity) |
Raw Data |
96 |
78 |
NN + MMD (NeurIPS 2014) |
- |
82 |
VFAE (ICLR 2016) |
57 |
85 |
Zero-Sum Game (NeurIPS 2017) |
57 |
89 |
Non-Zero-Sum Game |
40 |
89 |
Global-Optima |
20 |
86 |
Open Questions
- Understand fundamental trade-off between utility and semantic control.
- Understand achievable trade-off between utility and semantic control.
- Optimization of adversarial training, especially three player games under general settings.
- Large scale applications.
- $\dots$
Summary
- A striving step towards explicitly control the semantic information in learned representations.
- Adversarial Representation Learning is a promising approach.
- Many unanswered open questions and practical challenges.
- Next generation of machine learning systems have to be designed with security/privacy/fairness constraints.